Trusting Trust

> To what degree might this ever be an issue with Pharo and how might it be
> mitigated ?
>
> cheers, -ben
>
> [1]
> http://lists.squeakfoundation.org/pipermail/squeak-dev/1999-January/011116.html
> [2] http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf
> [3] http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/01/countering_trus.html
>
>
>

>
> This is slightly paranoid thinking, but considering the long evolution
> of Smalltalk live images (apparently all the way from the original Xerox
> PARC ST80 [1] ) in relation to Ken Thompson's "Reflections on Trusting
> Trust" [2] - are there any mechanisms to prevent trojan code living
> undetected inside a Smalltalk compiler/decompiler ? Bruce Schneier [3]
> provides a shorter overview of [2] if that is not to your taste.
>
> To what degree might this ever be an issue with Pharo and how might it
> be mitigated ?

> On 02/07/2012 02:47 PM, Ben Coman wrote:
>>
>> This is slightly paranoid thinking, but considering the long evolution
>> of Smalltalk live images (apparently all the way from the original Xerox
>> PARC ST80 [1] ) in relation to Ken Thompson's "Reflections on Trusting
>> Trust" [2] - are there any mechanisms to prevent trojan code living
>> undetected inside a Smalltalk compiler/decompiler ? Bruce Schneier [3]
>> provides a shorter overview of [2] if that is not to your taste.
>>
>> To what degree might this ever be an issue with Pharo and how might it
>> be mitigated ?
>
> I think it's worse in Pharo because you're never bootstrapping from source. From all you know the tools could be subverted to show you a different code than is actually running in the system.

>
> On Feb 8, 2012, at 9:35 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>
>> On 02/07/2012 02:47 PM, Ben Coman wrote:
>>>
>>> This is slightly paranoid thinking, but considering the long evolution
>>> of Smalltalk live images (apparently all the way from the original Xerox
>>> PARC ST80 [1] ) in relation to Ken Thompson's "Reflections on Trusting
>>> Trust" [2] - are there any mechanisms to prevent trojan code living
>>> undetected inside a Smalltalk compiler/decompiler ? Bruce Schneier [3]
>>> provides a shorter overview of [2] if that is not to your taste.
>>>
>>> To what degree might this ever be an issue with Pharo and how might it
>>> be mitigated ?
>>
>> I think it's worse in Pharo because you're never bootstrapping from source. From all you know the tools could be subverted to show you a different code than is actually running in the system.
>
> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.

>
> On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>
>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>
>> No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code because the tools don't display you the actual code.
>>
> But this stays the same with a boot-strap, as you will use a compomised compiler to bootstrap the bootstrap.
>
> There is nothing you can do against it. It's true for GCC or Java, too.

> On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote:
>>
>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>
>>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>>
>>> No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code because the tools don't display you the actual code.
>>>
>> But this stays the same with a boot-strap, as you will use a compomised compiler to bootstrap the bootstrap.
>>
>> There is nothing you can do against it. It's true for GCC or Java, too.
>
> Yes, but read the links on how you can use a different, second compiler.
>

>
> Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall:
>
>> On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote:
>>>
>>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>>
>>>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>>>
>>>> No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code because the tools don't display you the actual code.
>>>>
>>> But this stays the same with a boot-strap, as you will use a compomised compiler to bootstrap the bootstrap.
>>>
>>> There is nothing you can do against it. It's true for GCC or Java, too.
>>
>> Yes, but read the links on how you can use a different, second compiler.
>>
> And what if the second compiler is compromised, too? An operating system is also a virtual environment. So what if that environment is rooted, lives in another shell?
> The "what if"-question in a security context can be played infinitely. The compromisable areas are only defined in opposite where you have put some trust. Or saying it in other words: There is no trust until you put it somewhere.

>
> Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall:
>
>> On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote:
>>>
>>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>>
>>>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>>>
>>>> No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code because the tools don't display you the actual code.
>>>>
>>> But this stays the same with a boot-strap, as you will use a compomised compiler to bootstrap the bootstrap.
>>>
>>> There is nothing you can do against it. It's true for GCC or Java, too.
>>
>> Yes, but read the links on how you can use a different, second compiler.
>>
> And what if the second compiler is compromised, too?

> On 02/08/2012 11:33 AM, Norbert Hartl wrote:
>>
>> Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall:
>>
>>> On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>>>>
>>>>> No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code because the tools don't display you the actual code.
>>>>>
>>>> But this stays the same with a boot-strap, as you will use a compomised compiler to bootstrap the bootstrap.
>>>>
>>>> There is nothing you can do against it. It's true for GCC or Java, too.
>>>
>>> Yes, but read the links on how you can use a different, second compiler.
>>>
>> And what if the second compiler is compromised, too?
>
> Am I the only one who read the link?
>

> On 8 February 2012 10:33, Norbert Hartl <[hidden email]> wrote:
>  
>> Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall:
>>    
>>> On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote:
>>>      
>>>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>>>
>>>>        
>>>>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>>>>>            
>>>>> No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code because the tools don't display you the actual code.
>>>>>
>>>>>          
>>>> But this stays the same with a boot-strap, as you will use a compomised compiler to bootstrap the bootstrap.
>>>>
>>>> There is nothing you can do against it. It's true for GCC or Java, too.
>>>>        
>>> Yes, but read the links on how you can use a different, second compiler.
>>>
>>>      
>> And what if the second compiler is compromised, too? An operating system is also a virtual environment. So what if that environment is rooted, lives in another shell?
>> The "what if"-question in a security context can be played infinitely. The compromisable areas are only defined in opposite where you have put some trust. Or saying it in other words: There is no trust until you put it somewhere.
>>
>> Norbert
>>    
>
> Indeed; that's precisely the point: both compilers need to be
> subverted in the SAME way in order for you not to notice. The chances
> of that happening are much lower than not anything at all!
>  
> Regarding "There is no trust until you put it somewhere", my favourite
> webcomic (http://www.schlockmercenary.com/) puts it thusly: "A little
> trust goes a long way. The less you use, the further you'll go."
>
> But of course it takes time and effort into removing the trust you've
> placed in your compiler. It would not be unreasonable for Pharo to say
> "yes, we know that we're trusting the compiler" simply because there
> are other, more pressing matters.
>
> frank
>  

> On Feb 8, 2012, at 9:35 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>
>  
>> I think it's worse in Pharo because you're never bootstrapping from source. From all you know the tools could be subverted to show you a different code than is actually running in the system.
>>    
>
> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
> If you have a bootstrap in C or assembly it does make me more confident.
>
> So the argument while nice at first sight does not hold a second. Now we will get a bootstrapped version of pharo
> believe me :)
>
>  

> Frank Shearar wrote:
>>
>> On 8 February 2012 10:33, Norbert Hartl <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the
>>>>>> other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code because the
>>>>>> tools don't display you the actual code.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But this stays the same with a boot-strap, as you will use a compomised
>>>>> compiler to bootstrap the bootstrap.
>>>>>
>>>>> There is nothing you can do against it. It's true for GCC or Java, too.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes, but read the links on how you can use a different, second compiler.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> And what if the second compiler is compromised, too? An operating system
>>> is also a virtual environment. So what if that environment is rooted, lives
>>> in another shell?
>>> The "what if"-question in a security context can be played infinitely.
>>> The compromisable areas are only defined in opposite where you have put some
>>> trust. Or saying it in other words: There is no trust until you put it
>>> somewhere.
>>>
>>> Norbert
>>>
>>
>>
>> Indeed; that's precisely the point: both compilers need to be
>> subverted in the SAME way in order for you not to notice. The chances
>> of that happening are much lower than not anything at all!
>>  Regarding "There is no trust until you put it somewhere", my favourite
>> webcomic (http://www.schlockmercenary.com/) puts it thusly: "A little
>> trust goes a long way. The less you use, the further you'll go."
>>
>> But of course it takes time and effort into removing the trust you've
>> placed in your compiler. It would not be unreasonable for Pharo to say
>> "yes, we know that we're trusting the compiler" simply because there
>> are other, more pressing matters.
>>
>> frank
>>
>
> Security is not an absolute - it is a spectrum.  My usual example is
> comparing at one extreme keeping all your savings in shoe boxes under you
> bed.  Very simple to use but also easily subverted.  At the other extreme
> you keep all your savings behind several bank vault doors under a mountain.
>  'Almost' absolutely secure but not very usable.  In practice the line is
> drawn somewhere between by balancing risks, effort and usability.  It is
> useful to consider each extreme to help balancing these conflicting
> priorities.
>
> I like the term "practical paranoia."  Think paranoid to be aware of the
> issues, then decide based on practical matters what to do about them.   The
> Pharo image is a single binary evolving over more than twenty years.  At one
> extreme you implicitly trust _every_ unknown hand that ever had access to
> the trunk.  At the other extreme "most" people _are_ good people.  Pharo
> certainly has more pressing matters, but the aim should be to reduce the
> surface area of attack/trust where possible.  A single bootstrap step
> without Diverse Double-Compiling goes a long way to achieving this.
>
> Stéphane Ducasse wrote:
>>
>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 9:35 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> I think it's worse in Pharo because you're never bootstrapping from
>>> source. From all you know the tools could be subverted to show you a
>>> different code than is actually running in the system.
>>>
>>
>>
>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>> If you have a bootstrap in C or assembly it does make me more confident.
>>
>> So the argument while nice at first sight does not hold a second. Now we
>> will get a bootstrapped version of pharo believe me :)
>>
>>
>
> That is good to hear.  My contemplation of this stemmed from seeing the stub
> for bootstrapping in the PharoVision document.  This dredged up a memory of
> reading the articles long ago and was was interested in views of how it
> applied today.  While there are a lot of other benefits from bootstrapping,
> security provides just one more reason to justify the effort.
> Thanks for your thought,
> Cheers, -ben
>
>
>

> Do you really think that the compiler is the real Achille heal in an
> image where everything work by message send?
> IMO, the compiler is much less central than in other languages.
>
> What I would do to fool users and tools would just be to hack a few
> methods like #methodDict (just like Stephane proposed for example).
> I would arrange to not answer the true methodDict but a fake for a few classes.
> Create a class var in Behavior, like FakedBehaviors := Dictionary new.
> Then modify Behavior>>methodDict
>     ^FakedBehaviors at: self ifAbsent: [methodDict]
>
> Then you can start populating FakedBehaviors.
> Of course, you would begin by faking Behavior itself to not be caught.
>
> Then you could also arrange to falsify Smalltalk at:
> #MethodDictionary, just to avoid a sneaker to try (MethodDictionary
> allInstances), and let a class var hook in Behavior refer to the
> TrueMethodDictionary etc... fake instVarAt: to never return the true
> methodDict, fake the messages concerning Behavior classPool to hide
> your piracy... Or better, don't use a class var at all, but just hack
> a literal in the hacked method... Faking the whole IDE is a lot more
> work (think of inspectors, debuggers, Object tracing etc..), but
> really is possible, and removing clues is also possible, it's just a
> bootstrap problem ;)
>
> There is no in-image parade, you'd have to use tracing from outside.
>
> Nicolas
>
> 2012/2/8 Ben Coman <[hidden email]>:
>  
>> Frank Shearar wrote:
>>    
>>> On 8 February 2012 10:33, Norbert Hartl <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>>
>>>      
>>>> Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall:
>>>>
>>>>        
>>>>> On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>          
>>>>>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>            
>>>>>>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>                
>>>>>>> No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the
>>>>>>> other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code because the
>>>>>>> tools don't display you the actual code.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>              
>>>>>> But this stays the same with a boot-strap, as you will use a compomised
>>>>>> compiler to bootstrap the bootstrap.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is nothing you can do against it. It's true for GCC or Java, too.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>            
>>>>> Yes, but read the links on how you can use a different, second compiler.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>          
>>>> And what if the second compiler is compromised, too? An operating system
>>>> is also a virtual environment. So what if that environment is rooted, lives
>>>> in another shell?
>>>> The "what if"-question in a security context can be played infinitely.
>>>> The compromisable areas are only defined in opposite where you have put some
>>>> trust. Or saying it in other words: There is no trust until you put it
>>>> somewhere.
>>>>
>>>> Norbert
>>>>
>>>>        
>>> Indeed; that's precisely the point: both compilers need to be
>>> subverted in the SAME way in order for you not to notice. The chances
>>> of that happening are much lower than not anything at all!
>>>  Regarding "There is no trust until you put it somewhere", my favourite
>>> webcomic (http://www.schlockmercenary.com/) puts it thusly: "A little
>>> trust goes a long way. The less you use, the further you'll go."
>>>
>>> But of course it takes time and effort into removing the trust you've
>>> placed in your compiler. It would not be unreasonable for Pharo to say
>>> "yes, we know that we're trusting the compiler" simply because there
>>> are other, more pressing matters.
>>>
>>> frank
>>>
>>>      
>> Security is not an absolute - it is a spectrum.  My usual example is
>> comparing at one extreme keeping all your savings in shoe boxes under you
>> bed.  Very simple to use but also easily subverted.  At the other extreme
>> you keep all your savings behind several bank vault doors under a mountain.
>>  'Almost' absolutely secure but not very usable.  In practice the line is
>> drawn somewhere between by balancing risks, effort and usability.  It is
>> useful to consider each extreme to help balancing these conflicting
>> priorities.
>>
>> I like the term "practical paranoia."  Think paranoid to be aware of the
>> issues, then decide based on practical matters what to do about them.   The
>> Pharo image is a single binary evolving over more than twenty years.  At one
>> extreme you implicitly trust _every_ unknown hand that ever had access to
>> the trunk.  At the other extreme "most" people _are_ good people.  Pharo
>> certainly has more pressing matters, but the aim should be to reduce the
>> surface area of attack/trust where possible.  A single bootstrap step
>> without Diverse Double-Compiling goes a long way to achieving this.
>>
>> Stéphane Ducasse wrote:
>>    
>>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 9:35 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>      
>>>> I think it's worse in Pharo because you're never bootstrapping from
>>>> source. From all you know the tools could be subverted to show you a
>>>> different code than is actually running in the system.
>>>>
>>>>        
>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>> If you have a bootstrap in C or assembly it does make me more confident.
>>>
>>> So the argument while nice at first sight does not hold a second. Now we
>>> will get a bootstrapped version of pharo believe me :)
>>>
>>>
>>>      
>> That is good to hear.  My contemplation of this stemmed from seeing the stub
>> for bootstrapping in the PharoVision document.  This dredged up a memory of
>> reading the articles long ago and was was interested in views of how it
>> applied today.  While there are a lot of other benefits from bootstrapping,
>> security provides just one more reason to justify the effort.
>> Thanks for your thought,
>> Cheers, -ben
>>
>>
>>
>>    
>
>
>  

>
> Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall:
>
>> On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote:
>>>
>>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>>
>>>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>>>
>>>> No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code because the tools don't display you the actual code.
>>>>
>>> But this stays the same with a boot-strap, as you will use a compomised compiler to bootstrap the bootstrap.
>>>
>>> There is nothing you can do against it. It's true for GCC or Java, too.
>>
>> Yes, but read the links on how you can use a different, second compiler.
>>
> And what if the second compiler is compromised, too? An operating system is also a virtual environment. So what if that environment is rooted, lives in another shell?
> The "what if"-question in a security context can be played infinitely. The compromisable areas are only defined in opposite where you have put some trust. Or saying it in other words: There is no trust until you put it somewhere.
>

> You are right.  The compiler binary described in the scenario corresponds to
> the whole of the Smalltalk binary image.
>
>
> Nicolas Cellier wrote:
>>
>> Do you really think that the compiler is the real Achille heal in an
>> image where everything work by message send?
>> IMO, the compiler is much less central than in other languages.
>>
>> What I would do to fool users and tools would just be to hack a few
>> methods like #methodDict (just like Stephane proposed for example).
>> I would arrange to not answer the true methodDict but a fake for a few
>> classes.
>> Create a class var in Behavior, like FakedBehaviors := Dictionary new.
>> Then modify Behavior>>methodDict
>>    ^FakedBehaviors at: self ifAbsent: [methodDict]
>>
>> Then you can start populating FakedBehaviors.
>> Of course, you would begin by faking Behavior itself to not be caught.
>>
>> Then you could also arrange to falsify Smalltalk at:
>> #MethodDictionary, just to avoid a sneaker to try (MethodDictionary
>> allInstances), and let a class var hook in Behavior refer to the
>> TrueMethodDictionary etc... fake instVarAt: to never return the true
>> methodDict, fake the messages concerning Behavior classPool to hide
>> your piracy... Or better, don't use a class var at all, but just hack
>> a literal in the hacked method... Faking the whole IDE is a lot more
>> work (think of inspectors, debuggers, Object tracing etc..), but
>> really is possible, and removing clues is also possible, it's just a
>> bootstrap problem ;)
>>
>> There is no in-image parade, you'd have to use tracing from outside.
>>
>> Nicolas
>>
>> 2012/2/8 Ben Coman <[hidden email]>:
>>
>>>
>>> Frank Shearar wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 8 February 2012 10:33, Norbert Hartl <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the
>>>>>>>> other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code
>>>>>>>> because the
>>>>>>>> tools don't display you the actual code.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But this stays the same with a boot-strap, as you will use a
>>>>>>> compomised
>>>>>>> compiler to bootstrap the bootstrap.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There is nothing you can do against it. It's true for GCC or Java,
>>>>>>> too.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, but read the links on how you can use a different, second
>>>>>> compiler.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> And what if the second compiler is compromised, too? An operating
>>>>> system
>>>>> is also a virtual environment. So what if that environment is rooted,
>>>>> lives
>>>>> in another shell?
>>>>> The "what if"-question in a security context can be played infinitely.
>>>>> The compromisable areas are only defined in opposite where you have put
>>>>> some
>>>>> trust. Or saying it in other words: There is no trust until you put it
>>>>> somewhere.
>>>>>
>>>>> Norbert
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Indeed; that's precisely the point: both compilers need to be
>>>> subverted in the SAME way in order for you not to notice. The chances
>>>> of that happening are much lower than not anything at all!
>>>>  Regarding "There is no trust until you put it somewhere", my favourite
>>>> webcomic (http://www.schlockmercenary.com/) puts it thusly: "A little
>>>> trust goes a long way. The less you use, the further you'll go."
>>>>
>>>> But of course it takes time and effort into removing the trust you've
>>>> placed in your compiler. It would not be unreasonable for Pharo to say
>>>> "yes, we know that we're trusting the compiler" simply because there
>>>> are other, more pressing matters.
>>>>
>>>> frank
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> Security is not an absolute - it is a spectrum.  My usual example is
>>> comparing at one extreme keeping all your savings in shoe boxes under you
>>> bed.  Very simple to use but also easily subverted.  At the other extreme
>>> you keep all your savings behind several bank vault doors under a
>>> mountain.
>>>  'Almost' absolutely secure but not very usable.  In practice the line is
>>> drawn somewhere between by balancing risks, effort and usability.  It is
>>> useful to consider each extreme to help balancing these conflicting
>>> priorities.
>>>
>>> I like the term "practical paranoia."  Think paranoid to be aware of the
>>> issues, then decide based on practical matters what to do about them.
>>> The
>>> Pharo image is a single binary evolving over more than twenty years.  At
>>> one
>>> extreme you implicitly trust _every_ unknown hand that ever had access to
>>> the trunk.  At the other extreme "most" people _are_ good people.  Pharo
>>> certainly has more pressing matters, but the aim should be to reduce the
>>> surface area of attack/trust where possible.  A single bootstrap step
>>> without Diverse Double-Compiling goes a long way to achieving this.
>>>
>>> Stéphane Ducasse wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Feb 8, 2012, at 9:35 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think it's worse in Pharo because you're never bootstrapping from
>>>>> source. From all you know the tools could be subverted to show you a
>>>>> different code than is actually running in the system.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> well I do not think so since we can all read the code.
>>>> If you have a bootstrap in C or assembly it does make me more confident.
>>>>
>>>> So the argument while nice at first sight does not hold a second. Now we
>>>> will get a bootstrapped version of pharo believe me :)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> That is good to hear.  My contemplation of this stemmed from seeing the
>>> stub
>>> for bootstrapping in the PharoVision document.  This dredged up a memory
>>> of
>>> reading the articles long ago and was was interested in views of how it
>>> applied today.  While there are a lot of other benefits from
>>> bootstrapping,
>>> security provides just one more reason to justify the effort.
>>> Thanks for your thought,
>>> Cheers, -ben
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>