OpenSSL FIPS Revoked - Should we continue to try and certifiy Squeak?

> All,
>
> The only response I received about our proposal to try to get  
> certified was
> from Andreas who said he'd send it off to the Croquet board.  After  
> reading
> this article I really believe that we should try to get certified,  
> if for no
> other reason then to help the open source community in general.
>
> Is there still an interest in this group to go through this  
> process?  If so
> I will undertake the process of screening all certified labs to  
> find the
> strongest lab that understands the difficulty and intricacies of open
> source.
>
> Please respond back and let me know your support for the project  
> and your
> willingness to participate, or any other comments.
>
> I really think the process will be very beneficial and the  
> challenge you
> have to admit is a good one.
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Ron Teitelbaum
>
>
> Security validation of OpenSSL encryption tool uncertain
> Jaikumar Vijayan
>
>
> July 19, 2006 (Computerworld) A joint U.S. and Canadian  
> organization that
> certifies encryption tools for use by federal government agencies has
> suspended its validation of OpenSSL cryptographic technology for  
> the second
> time in less than six months.
>
> The decision means that government agencies can't purchase the open-
> source
> tool for the time being, although those that have already done so  
> will still
> be allowed to use it. OpenSSL is an open-source implementation of  
> the Secure
> Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer security protocols. It is  
> widely
> used to encrypt and decrypt data on the Internet.
>
> The decision to suspend validation of the tool came just two days  
> after the
> group doing the validation, the Cryptographic Module Validation  
> Program
> (CMVP) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology  
> (NIST), had
> taken the harsher step of revoking the tool entirely. It backed  
> away from
> that decision and opted for a suspension of the process instead.
>
> News of the rapid changes to the validation effort drew criticism  
> from the
> Hattiesburg, Miss.-based Open Source Software Institute (OSSI), a  
> nonprofit
> group trying to get the OpenSSL encryption module validated for use in
> government. John Weathersby, OSSI's executive director, today  
> alleged that
> the move appears to have been influenced by vendors of proprietary
> technologies that stand to lose a lucrative market if an open-source
> alternative is certified.
>
> "There are some vendors fighting like hell to make this die, and I  
> can see
> why," said Weathersby. "What's going on is the question of the day.  
> This is
> not a technology issue; this is a political issue."
> OpenSSL is supported on several major operating systems, including  
> many
> flavors of Unix, Apple Computer Inc.'s Mac OS X and Microsoft Corp.'s
> Windows.
>
> OpenSSL received its precedent-setting validation in January from  
> the CMVP,
> which is charged with validating and certifying that cryptographic  
> tools
> sold to government agencies meet the requirements of the Federal  
> Information
> Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2. The CMVP was  
> established by
> NIST in the U.S. and the Communications Security Establishment of the
> Canadian government.
>
> A validated OpenSSL tool would allow vendors of operating systems, Web
> browsers and other software products such as e-mail to include a  
> free FIPS
> 140-compliant cryptographic module. The OpenSSL FIPS 140-2  
> validation effort
> is sponsored by the Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support (DMLSS)
> program, which provides medical logistics support to the U.S.  
> Department of
> Defense.
>
> Currently, agencies looking for encryption capabilities spend  
> hundreds of
> thousands of dollars -- and in some cases, millions of dollars --  
> licensing
> proprietary cryptographic tools that are certified according to  
> FIPS 140.
> Since January, however, the validation for Open SSL has been  
> revoked and
> reinstated twice, Weathersby said. The first revocation happened in  
> January,
> barely four days after OpenSSL was first validated by CMVP. It was  
> awarded a
> FIPS 140-2 validation again in March after some changes were made  
> to the
> module.
>
> On Friday, OSSI was told that the validation had again been revoked,
> Weathersby said. That changed yesterday, when the organization  
> learned that
> the OpenSSL certificate had been incorrectly "revoked" and is now  
> instead
> "not available," he said. That means that the OpenSSL cryptographic  
> module
> can no longer be bought by government agencies, although it can be  
> used by
> those that already have it.
>
> NIST, in an e-mailed statement, confirmed the "not-available"  
> status but
> offered no reasons for it. "However, if noncompliance is discovered  
> in a
> module after it has been validated, and based on a risk assessment  
> it is
> deemed to be critical, the CMVP will advise all federal agencies to  
> cease
> using the affected module," NIST said.
>
> A representative for Domus IT Security Laboratory, the Ottawa-based  
> company
> that is evaluating products for FIPS 140 compliance, referred all  
> questions
> to the CMVP.
>
> The continuing uncertainly about the status of OpenSSL is sure to  
> prolong
> what has been a multiyear effort to certify the tool. Much of the  
> delay
> resulted from a continuing series of tweaks OSSI was required to  
> make to the
> cryptographic module at the request of the CMVP, said Steve Marquess,
> validation project manager at OSSI.
>
> Part of the problem stems from the fact that the FIPS requirements  
> were
> written for hardware-based encryption tools while OpenSSL is  
> software-based.
> As a result, mapping FIPS' requirements to OpenSSL has been  
> challenging,
> Marquess said.
>
> Vendors of commercial products have also raised a constant stream of
> technology-related questions that have proved time-consuming to  
> address.
> "There have been some commercial interests who are unhappy with  
> open-source
> validation like this," Marquess said. "One of them has been working  
> for
> several years to challenge multiple aspects of what we are trying  
> to do," he
> said without naming the vendor.
>
> One of the results is that the requirements for OpenSSL to get FIPS  
> 140-2
> validation has keeps changing, he said. "One of our frustrations  
> through
> this whole ordeal is pinning down the requirements in concrete  
> technical
> terms," he said. "The requirements keep changing on us all the time."
> George Adams, the president and CEO of SSH Communications Security  
> Inc., a
> Wellesley, Mass.-based vendor of encryption products, said that  
> concerns
> about the use of OpenSSL in government environments are valid. As an
> open-source tool, OpenSSL is subject to constant changes that would
> invalidate its certification on a regular basis, he said.
>
> For instance, any changes made to the source or linked library in the
> cryptographic module will create a nonvalidated module, he said.  
> Similarly,
> any additional cryptography outside of the validated module would  
> need to be
> tested and validated.
>
> Marquess dismissed such concerns. He said that the security policy
> associated with OpenSSL guarantees that the source code used to  
> generate the
> cryptographic module is unmodified at all times.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Cryptography mailing list
> [hidden email]
> http://lists.squeakfoundation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/ 
> cryptography

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Matthew S. Hamrick [mailto:[hidden email]]
> Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2006 1:15 PM
> To: [hidden email]; Cryptography Team Development List
> Cc: 'Andreas Raab'
> Subject: Re: [Cryptography Team] OpenSSL FIPS Revoked - Should we continue
> to try and certifiy Squeak?
>
> Hi Ron,
>
> Sorry for not responding to this earlier, it's been a pretty busy
> month for me and I'm just now getting around to catching up on email
> traffic.
>
> I think I'm in a pretty good position to comment on this subject,
> having worked for the Department of Homeland Security, managing part
> of their PKI integration process. Somewhere along the line someone
> also put my name down as a "Federal Smartcard Program Manager." I
> don't know what that means, but I did do some work with Smart Cards
> and when I mention it to some people they seem to take it relatively
> seriously.
>
> FIPS-140-2 is certainly important in the federal government. Laws
> exist that mandate it's use for certain federal projects. However...
> it's possible to get waivers for those laws. But FIPS-140-2 isn't the
> only certification regieme that applications and environments must
> adhere to. The Common Criteria are increasingly important as are
> adherence to the FIPS 800 series documents (though the latter are not
> certification processes in the commonly accepted sense.) Common
> Criteria covers much more than just crypto and there are Common
> Criteria for several aspects of system operation.
>
> I think what I'm getting at here is, if you're trying to get a Squeak
> application approved for use in the US or Canadian federal
> governments, FIPS is important, but if the application is compelling
> a waiver can be received. Common Criteria may be more important to
> the program manager, but that covers way more than just the Crypto.
> So you would probably have to have your whole VM, Image and Crypto
> change-set evaluated.
>
> And... if you're going to work on a particular standard, why not work
> on Suite B? The NSA has been recommending the use of AES and ECC for
> several months now, and I believe that if you buy into Suite-B, it
> may be easier to get a FIPS-140 waiver.
>
> -Cheers
> -Matt H.
>
> On Jul 20, 2006, at 9:50 AM, Ron Teitelbaum wrote:
>
> > All,
> >
> > The only response I received about our proposal to try to get
> > certified was
> > from Andreas who said he'd send it off to the Croquet board.  After
> > reading
> > this article I really believe that we should try to get certified,
> > if for no
> > other reason then to help the open source community in general.
> >
> > Is there still an interest in this group to go through this
> > process?  If so
> > I will undertake the process of screening all certified labs to
> > find the
> > strongest lab that understands the difficulty and intricacies of open
> > source.
> >
> > Please respond back and let me know your support for the project
> > and your
> > willingness to participate, or any other comments.
> >
> > I really think the process will be very beneficial and the
> > challenge you
> > have to admit is a good one.
> >
> > Thanks!
> >
> > -Ron Teitelbaum
> >
> >
> > Security validation of OpenSSL encryption tool uncertain
> > Jaikumar Vijayan
> >
> >
> > July 19, 2006 (Computerworld) A joint U.S. and Canadian
> > organization that
> > certifies encryption tools for use by federal government agencies has
> > suspended its validation of OpenSSL cryptographic technology for
> > the second
> > time in less than six months.
> >
> > The decision means that government agencies can't purchase the open-
> > source
> > tool for the time being, although those that have already done so
> > will still
> > be allowed to use it. OpenSSL is an open-source implementation of
> > the Secure
> > Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer security protocols. It is
> > widely
> > used to encrypt and decrypt data on the Internet.
> >
> > The decision to suspend validation of the tool came just two days
> > after the
> > group doing the validation, the Cryptographic Module Validation
> > Program
> > (CMVP) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology
> > (NIST), had
> > taken the harsher step of revoking the tool entirely. It backed
> > away from
> > that decision and opted for a suspension of the process instead.
> >
> > News of the rapid changes to the validation effort drew criticism
> > from the
> > Hattiesburg, Miss.-based Open Source Software Institute (OSSI), a
> > nonprofit
> > group trying to get the OpenSSL encryption module validated for use in
> > government. John Weathersby, OSSI's executive director, today
> > alleged that
> > the move appears to have been influenced by vendors of proprietary
> > technologies that stand to lose a lucrative market if an open-source
> > alternative is certified.
> >
> > "There are some vendors fighting like hell to make this die, and I
> > can see
> > why," said Weathersby. "What's going on is the question of the day.
> > This is
> > not a technology issue; this is a political issue."
> > OpenSSL is supported on several major operating systems, including
> > many
> > flavors of Unix, Apple Computer Inc.'s Mac OS X and Microsoft Corp.'s
> > Windows.
> >
> > OpenSSL received its precedent-setting validation in January from
> > the CMVP,
> > which is charged with validating and certifying that cryptographic
> > tools
> > sold to government agencies meet the requirements of the Federal
> > Information
> > Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2. The CMVP was
> > established by
> > NIST in the U.S. and the Communications Security Establishment of the
> > Canadian government.
> >
> > A validated OpenSSL tool would allow vendors of operating systems, Web
> > browsers and other software products such as e-mail to include a
> > free FIPS
> > 140-compliant cryptographic module. The OpenSSL FIPS 140-2
> > validation effort
> > is sponsored by the Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support (DMLSS)
> > program, which provides medical logistics support to the U.S.
> > Department of
> > Defense.
> >
> > Currently, agencies looking for encryption capabilities spend
> > hundreds of
> > thousands of dollars -- and in some cases, millions of dollars --
> > licensing
> > proprietary cryptographic tools that are certified according to
> > FIPS 140.
> > Since January, however, the validation for Open SSL has been
> > revoked and
> > reinstated twice, Weathersby said. The first revocation happened in
> > January,
> > barely four days after OpenSSL was first validated by CMVP. It was
> > awarded a
> > FIPS 140-2 validation again in March after some changes were made
> > to the
> > module.
> >
> > On Friday, OSSI was told that the validation had again been revoked,
> > Weathersby said. That changed yesterday, when the organization
> > learned that
> > the OpenSSL certificate had been incorrectly "revoked" and is now
> > instead
> > "not available," he said. That means that the OpenSSL cryptographic
> > module
> > can no longer be bought by government agencies, although it can be
> > used by
> > those that already have it.
> >
> > NIST, in an e-mailed statement, confirmed the "not-available"
> > status but
> > offered no reasons for it. "However, if noncompliance is discovered
> > in a
> > module after it has been validated, and based on a risk assessment
> > it is
> > deemed to be critical, the CMVP will advise all federal agencies to
> > cease
> > using the affected module," NIST said.
> >
> > A representative for Domus IT Security Laboratory, the Ottawa-based
> > company
> > that is evaluating products for FIPS 140 compliance, referred all
> > questions
> > to the CMVP.
> >
> > The continuing uncertainly about the status of OpenSSL is sure to
> > prolong
> > what has been a multiyear effort to certify the tool. Much of the
> > delay
> > resulted from a continuing series of tweaks OSSI was required to
> > make to the
> > cryptographic module at the request of the CMVP, said Steve Marquess,
> > validation project manager at OSSI.
> >
> > Part of the problem stems from the fact that the FIPS requirements
> > were
> > written for hardware-based encryption tools while OpenSSL is
> > software-based.
> > As a result, mapping FIPS' requirements to OpenSSL has been
> > challenging,
> > Marquess said.
> >
> > Vendors of commercial products have also raised a constant stream of
> > technology-related questions that have proved time-consuming to
> > address.
> > "There have been some commercial interests who are unhappy with
> > open-source
> > validation like this," Marquess said. "One of them has been working
> > for
> > several years to challenge multiple aspects of what we are trying
> > to do," he
> > said without naming the vendor.
> >
> > One of the results is that the requirements for OpenSSL to get FIPS
> > 140-2
> > validation has keeps changing, he said. "One of our frustrations
> > through
> > this whole ordeal is pinning down the requirements in concrete
> > technical
> > terms," he said. "The requirements keep changing on us all the time."
> > George Adams, the president and CEO of SSH Communications Security
> > Inc., a
> > Wellesley, Mass.-based vendor of encryption products, said that
> > concerns
> > about the use of OpenSSL in government environments are valid. As an
> > open-source tool, OpenSSL is subject to constant changes that would
> > invalidate its certification on a regular basis, he said.
> >
> > For instance, any changes made to the source or linked library in the
> > cryptographic module will create a nonvalidated module, he said.
> > Similarly,
> > any additional cryptography outside of the validated module would
> > need to be
> > tested and validated.
> >
> > Marquess dismissed such concerns. He said that the security policy
> > associated with OpenSSL guarantees that the source code used to
> > generate the
> > cryptographic module is unmodified at all times.
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Cryptography mailing list
> > [hidden email]
> > http://lists.squeakfoundation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/
> > cryptography
>